In the very popular FOX TV reality show, American Idol, the judges, who are presumably experts in evaluating singing effort, have no voting power when the field is narrowed to the top twenty-four contestants. It is only the votes of viewers that count. In the 2007 season of the show, one of the judges, Simon Cowell, threatened to quit the show if a contestant, Sanjaya Malakar, who was clearly a low-ability contestant, won the competition. He was concerned that the show was becoming a popularity contest instead of a singing contest. Is this a problem? Not necessarily. I show that, under certain conditions, making success in the contest dependent on a contestant's popularity and not solely on her singing ability or performance, could paradoxically increase aggregate singing effort. It may be optimal to give the entire voting power to the viewers whose evaluation of singing effort or ability is noisier.
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Introduction
American Idol and Dancing with the stars are two very successful reality shows 1 on the American TV networks, Fox and ABC, respectively. 2 American Idol is particularly successful. With the exception of the Super Bowl and the Academy Awards, American Idol is the highest rated viewed 3 program on U.S. national television and is broadcast in over 100 countries outside of the USA.
American Idol is a singing contest and Dancing with the Stars is a dancing contest. A unique feature of these two TV shows is that the votes of viewers count in determining the winner of the show. For example, in Dancing with the stars, the votes of both the viewers and the judges (i.e., the experts) count. In American Idol, only the votes of the judges count in the preliminary rounds and only the votes of viewers count in advanced rounds (i.e., when the field is narrowed to the top twenty-four contestants).
Since the judges and viewers may have different preferences, these can sometimes lead to problems. Indeed, in the 2007 season of American idol, there was a low-ability contestant, Sanjaya Malakar, who the judges did not like but kept advancing through the 1American Idol, which debuted in 2002, is an offshoot of Pop Idol, a British television (singing) reality show which debuted on the ITV network in 2001. As noted at wikipedia.com, the Idol series has become an international franchise; it has spun off many successful shows such as Australian Idol, Latin American Idol, Idols (Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, South Africa), Canadian Idol, Idols West Africa, Indian Idol, Indonesian Idol, New Zealand Idol, Hay Superstar, Nouvelle Star , Pinoy Idol (Philippines), Deutschland sucht den Superstar, Singapore Idol, Malaysian Idol, Vietnam Idol, Music Idol, Ídolos Brazil, Ídolos Portugal, and Super Star.
2 rounds because the viewers liked him. One of the judges, Simon Cowell, threatened to quit the show if Sanjaya won the competition.
To be sure, American Idol is a singing contest, but it sometimes runs the risk of becoming a popularity contest. One way of dealing with this apparent problem is to allocate the entire voting power to the judges. However, that might lead to a huge fall in TV ratings and revenue. A reason why the votes of viewers is allowed to determine the winner(s) is because it gives the viewers a sense of participation and increases the numbers of viewers leading to an increase in TV ratings and revenue. Allowing the votes of viewers to count increases the excitement of the show. There may well be a trade-off between this participation effect and the possible disincentive effect on singing effort of allowing any Tom, Dick, and Harry who has a phone to vote.
In American Idol, as mentioned above, only the votes of judges count in preliminary rounds. This allows the judges to narrow the set of possible contestants in order to possibly minimize any subsequent errors in selection that might emerge when viewers' votes later determine the winner(s) in subsequent rounds. However, as the Sanjaya case demonstrated, this cannot eliminate this risk. Alternatively, in Dancing with the stars this problem may have been addressed by assigning non-zero weights to the votes of the judges and viewers. But how should these weights be determined? What factors should be taken into account? Could the American Idol allocation of voting power be optimal? In this paper, I show, among others, that differences in the abilities of the contestants should be an important consideration. I show that, under certain conditions, making success in the contest dependent on a contestant's popularity and not solely on her singing ability or performance, could 3 paradoxically increase aggregate singing effort. By allowing the votes of viewers to count, sufficient noise is introduced into the contest since the viewers tend to care more, relative to the judges, about factors other than a contestant's singing ability or performance. This low-powered incentive can paradoxically lead to an increase in aggregate efforts because it levels the playing field between high-ability contestants and low-ability contestants inducing the low-ability contestants to exert more effort which, in turn, puts pressure on the high-ability to work harder. I demonstrate this result in the next section and relate it to other results in the literature on contests and incentives. Section 3 concludes the paper. I normalize the prize of winning the contest to 1. Let C k (x k ) = θ k C(x k ) be the cost of effort to contestant k, where θ k is a positive parameter and C(x k ) is increasing and strictly convex. If θ 1 < θ 2 , then contestant 1 has a higher ability than contestant 2 since his cost of exerting effort is lower.
An American-Idol type contest: a model
Let α be the weight given to the votes of viewers, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Then contestant k will win the contest, if αy k + (1-α)q k > αy j + (1-α)q j , k = 1, 2, j =1,2, and k ≠ j. Then contestant 1's payoff is
where m ≡ α(ε 2 -ε 1 ) + (1-α)(η 2 -η 1 ). Since ε k and η k are normally distributed with mean zero and variances 2 ε σ and 2 η σ , it follows that m is normally distributed with mean zero 4 My treatment of the judges' votes is analogous to the voting rule in Dancing with the Stars and figure skating competitions. Each judge in these contests scores a contestant's performance out of 10 and a contestants' overall score is the sum of the judges' scores. Amegashie (2006) studies the incentive effects of voting by judges in international figure skating within the context of the figure skating scandal at the 2002 winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, USA. 5 To the extent that the judges' votes and/or comments are observed by the viewers in both American Idol and Dancing with the Stars before the viewers cast their votes, one may argue that the judges' votes could affect components of the viewers' vote function. For simplicity and to allow me focus on the main argument of the paper, I do not consider this possible effect. and variance σ 2 = α 2 ( 2 ε σ + 2 ε σ ) + (1-α) 2 ( 2 η σ + 2 η σ ). Let g be the density function of m and G be its distribution function.
We can write contestant 1's payoff as
(1)
Similarly, contestant 2's payoff is
First-order conditions for an interior solution require that 0 )
. This can be rewritten as
From (3) and (4), it follows that, in equilibrium, )
. Then the strict convexity of C(x k ) implies that * 2 * 1 x x > , if θ 1 < θ 2 . Therefore, in equilibrium, the contestant with the higher ability exerts a greater effort. Without any loss of generality, I assume that θ 2 ≥ θ 1 . Hence, contestant 1 is has a higher ability than contestant 2.
As in tournament models, the existence of pure-strategy equilibria is not guaranteed. Pure-strategy equilibria exist if the variance of the error terms is sufficiently high. 6 To elaborate on this, note that second-order conditions require
This condition holds for the high-ability contestant since 0 ) x x ( g 2 1 < − ′ given * 2 * 1 x x > and C(x 1 ) is strictly convex.
However, it may not hold for the low-ability contestant. We can rewrite the low-ability contestant's second-order condition as
The first-term on the left hand side is positive since
. Therefore, a sufficient but not necessary condition for (5) to hold is
To simplify the analysis, I assume that C(x k ) = exp(x k ), k = 1,2. 7 Then since x 2 ≥ 0
is monotonically increasing in x 2 , it follows that 
Then there exists an interior solution if σ 2 is sufficiently high such that (6a) holds.
Given that ) 
where
In other words, relative to the judges, the viewers' voting behavior is influenced sufficiently more by factors other than the singing effort of the contestants. As argued previously, I interpret this as meaning that the viewers are influenced more by the popularity of contestants than the judges are.
When the contestants are identical (i.e., θ 1 = θ 2 ), then b = 1 since * 1 x = * 2 x = x*. So
Therefore, if the contestants are identical increasing the noise in the contest will unambiguously decrease aggregate efforts.
If the contestants are non-identical, then b > 1. It follows that if α ∂ σ ∂ / > 0 and (ln(b)/σ) 2 -1 > 0, the derivative in (8) is positive. The latter condition holds if σ 2 is sufficiently low and/or b is sufficiently high. So under these conditions, an increase in the voting weight of the viewers, whose vote is influenced relatively more by factors other than the singing effort of the contestants, could paradoxically lead to an increase in the aggregate singing effort in the contest. This means that α* = 1 could be optimal. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Consider a contest, such as American Idol, with expert judges and nonexpert judges (i.e., the viewers). If (i) the viewers' voting behavior is sufficiently noisier than that of the expert judges, (ii) the difference in the ability of the contestants is sufficiently high, and (iii) the weighted noise of the expert judges' votes and the viewers'
votes is sufficiently low, then giving a bigger voting weight to the viewers would lead to an increase in aggregate effort in the contest.
Discussion and relation to previous literature
The intuition for the result in the preceding paragraph is based on a well-known result in contests. The more level is the playing field, the higher is aggregate efforts. In the same vein, increasing the voting weight of the viewers introduces more noise into the contest and does not make success too sensitive to effort. This levels the playing field by giving low-ability contestants a reasonable chance of success and thereby inducing them to boost their effort. By boosting their effort, they force the high-ability contestants to also boost their effort (i.e., * 2 * 1 x / x ∂ ∂ > 0). It is important to note that this effect is a strategic effect. Knowing that the effort of a high-ability contestant does not have a very strong impact on his success in the contest induces a low-ability contestant to exert more effort than he would otherwise. And this forces the high-ability contestant to react accordingly.
To be sure, there are two opposing effects: a contestant has the incentive to slack if the contest becomes noisier. For want of a better term, I refer to this as the nonstrategic effect. However, the strategic effect described above may be strong enough to counteract this non-strategic effect. The ambiguity of the derivative in (8) is the result of 9 these two opposing effects. This strategic effect exists when the contestants are nonidentical (i.e., b >1) and it is very strong if the difference in the abilities of the contestants is sufficiently high (i.e., b is sufficiently high). When the contestants are identical, then by definition, there cannot be a common change in the contest that will level the playing field anymore than it already is. 8
On the preceding point, it is interesting to note that Sanjaya Malakar, realizing that he had a decent chance of being the winner or advancing to subsequent rounds (in The intuition behind the above result has been applied in other papers. For example, Che and Gale (1998) showed that a cap on lobbying could lead to an increase in aggregate lobbying because high-ability contestants find it more difficult to pre-empt the efforts of low-ability contestants. Amegashie and Kutsoati (2007) also apply this reasoning to a third-party's intervention decision in a conflict. In their model, helping a faction in the conflict, which takes the form of subsidizing his cost of effort, increases his valuation (i.e., the valuation effect). This will cause him to increase his effort. But this help also exerts an inequality effect by widening the "playing field" if the stronger faction is helped and narrowing it if the weaker faction is helped. Hence if the weaker faction is helped, the valuation effect and the inequality effect move in the same direction resulting in an increase in the aggregate cost of conflict. So the weaker faction should not be helped if the third-party's goal is to reduce the aggregate cost of the conflict. On the other hand, helping the stronger faction widens the difference in the abilities of the contestants, so the inequality effect will result in a fall in aggregate effort. Of course, the increase in the valuation of the stronger faction will lead to an increase in his effort. Therefore, if the third-party wants to minimize the aggregate cost of the conflict, then he should help the stronger party if the inequality effect dominates the valuation effect. 10 Otherwise, he should not help either faction. Szymanski and Valletti (2005) found that in a contest with an outstanding contestant, concentrating the entire prize into a grand single prize for first place may actually lower aggregate efforts, since the other contestants may not exert enough effort because they do not think that the have a decent chance of winning. By splitting the prize into a first prize and a second prize, the playing field is somewhat leveled inducing the low-ability contestants to exert greater effort which, in turn, forces the outstanding contestant to also increase his effort. Finally, Fu (2006) found that if a contest-designer handicaps a high-ability contestant relative to a low-ability contestant, aggregate efforts increase although this widens the difference in efforts between the contestants.
One may argue that placing some weight on popularity may cause the contestants to divert their efforts from singing into non-singing efforts in the competition. In this case, one requires a model where the contestants invest in both singing and non-singing efforts. Such a contest will be similar to multi-activity contests as in Amegashie (2006) , Konrad and Clark (2007) , and Arbatskaya and Mialon (2007) . To focus on the key driving force behind proposition 1, I do not consider this possible effect.
Indeed, the diversion of efforts from singing to non-singing efforts is not borne out in reality. For example, contestants in American Idol focus their energies on improving their singing performance. They understand that they are in singing contest. (Szymanski, 2003) . Viewers may prefer a more balanced contest to a lopsided contest even if aggregate effort in the former is lower. If we use the difference in efforts, * 1
x -* 2 x = ln(b) as the measure of competitive balance then there is no change in competitive balance as the voting weight of the viewers is increased.
Ideally, the contest designers prefer a contestant who is popular on the show and also has a high singing ability. But it appears that if they had to choose between the two, they would rather go for someone with a high singing ability and moderate popularity rather than someone with mediocre singing ability but with high popularity. This is because marketing and promotion agencies in the music industry can boost the popularity of a high-ability singer (after s/he has won the competition) through the choice of clothing, facial make up, appearances on talk shows, etc. It is much harder to improve the singing ability of a mediocre talent. And the popularity of a mediocre singing talent will eventually wane.
Conclusion
In this short article, I have argued that while some may perceive the very successful Fox TV reality show, American Idol, as turning into a popularity contest instead of the singing contest it is supposed to be, this need not be a problem. On the contrary, this could boost incentives by boosting aggregate efforts in singing. If viewers voted based solely on singing performance, low-ability contestants may not strive hard enough because their chances of winning the competition will be very small. This will, in turn, cause high-ability contestants to exert a lower effort than they otherwise would. By not making success in the contest too sensitive to effort, low-ability contestants are paradoxically induced to exert a higher singing effort. This, in turn, forces the highability contestants to work harder and not be complacent. Hence, the current voting rule in American Idol under which only the votes of viewers count when the number of contestants is narrowed to twenty-four may be good for incentives. For the same reasons, giving some weight to the votes of viewers in Dancing with the Stars could also be good for incentives.
There may yet be another reason why the current voting rule in American Idol may not have perverse effects. Since the votes of viewers only count after the set of contestants has been narrowed to twenty-four by the judges, it is likely that there will not be substantial differences in the abilities of the contestants. However, the judges sometimes get it wrong as the Sanjaya case showed. And to be sure, the judges are not totally certain of a contestant's ability. Indeed, that is what the show is about: to discover talent. But doing so depends on giving the right incentives to elicit sufficient singing efforts from the contestants. Even a high-ability contestant may rest on her laurels or be complacent without the right incentives. Introducing sufficient noise into the contest by giving the viewers sufficient voting power may well be a desirable incentive mechanism.
As noted in section 1, making the votes of viewers count may also be a necessary evil intended to make viewers feel a sense of participation and boost TV ratings of the 14 show. This article has shown that this participation motive may also have other desirable incentive effects.
There is, of course, now a literature in economics that recognizes that diluting incentives or giving low-powered incentives may actually be efficient (see the survey in Francois and Vlassopoulos (2007) and the references therein). This piece may also be seen as a contribution to that literature.
